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Abstract
Models in Multicriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) can be analyzed by means
of an importance index and an interaction index for every group of criteria. We
consider first discrete models in MCDA, without further restriction, which amounts
to considering multichoice games, that is, cooperative games with several levels of
participation. We propose and axiomatize an interaction index for multichoice
games. In a second part, we consider the continuous case, supposing that the
continuous model is obtained from a discrete one by means of the Choquet integral.
Keywords: multicriteria decision analysis, interaction, multichoice game, Choquet inte-
gral
1 Introduction
An important issue in MultiCriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) is to be able to analyse
and explain a numerical model, obtained by elicitation of preferences of the decision
maker. A classical way to do this is to assess the importance of each criterion (see a general
approach to define an importance index in (Ridaoui et al., 2017a)). This description of
the model may appear to be sufficient in the case of simple models, which are additive
in essence (e.g., additive utility models), as it is well known that they imply mutual
preferential independence of criteria (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). However, in case of more
complex models, the preferential independence among criteria does not hold any more,
and interaction appears among criteria, so that a description of the model by the sole
importance indices is not sufficient any more. For example, for models where aggregation
of preference is done through a Choquet integral w.r.t. a capacity, an interaction index is
defined for any group of criteria (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2010), which is a generalization
of the interaction index for pairs of criteria proposed by Murofushi and Soneda (1993).
Roughly speaking, a positive interaction index induces a conjunctive behavior (like the
minimum operator), while a negative interaction index induces a disjunctive behavior
(maximum).
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The aim of the paper is to propose an axiomatic foundation of an interaction index
for a MCDA model with no special restriction (and in particular, mutual preferential
independence is not supposed to hold). In a first step, the attributes are supposed to
be defined on a finite universe. Then, such a model is equivalent to what is called a
multichoice game in game theory (Hsiao and Raghavan, 1993), that is, a game on a set of
players N , where each player can play at a level of participation represented by an integer
between 0 and k. Up to our knowledge, there is no definition of an interaction index for
multichoice games. Nevertheless, there exists a general form of interaction index for
games on lattices (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2007), and multichoice games with k levels
can be considered as games on the lattice (k + 1)N . This interaction index is defined,
however, for any element of the lattice x ∈ (k+1)N , i.e., any profile of participation of the
players. This does not make sense for our purpose, since we are looking for an interaction
index defined for groups of players/criteria. It is the contribution of this paper to provide
such an index, and to give a characterization of it.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the necessary material and
notation. Section 3 summarizes previous works on the interaction index (the case of
classical games and the case of games on lattices). Our work on the importance index
for multichoice games is summarized in Section 4, since some of the axioms are necessary
for our approach. Section 5 gives the main result of the paper, which is the definition
and characterization of an interaction index for multichoice games, and consequently for
general discrete MCDA models. In Section 6, we address the continuous case, supposing
that the model is obtained from a discrete one via the Choquet integral.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, the cardinality of sets will be denoted by corresponding lower case
letters, i.e., |N | := n, |S| := s, etc. For notational convenience, we will omit braces for
singletons, i.e., S ∪ {i} is written S ∪ i, etc.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a fixed and finite set which can be thought as the set of
attributes or criteria (in MCDA), players (in cooperative game theory), etc., depending
on the domain of application. In this paper, we will mainly focus on MCDA applications.
We suppose that each attribute i ∈ N takes values in a set Li, which is supposed to
be finite and denoted by Li = {0, 1, . . . , ki}. The alternatives are represented as elements
of the Cartesian product L := L1 × . . .× Ln. An alternative is thus written as a vector
x = (x1, . . . , xn) where xi ∈ Li for all i ∈ N . For each i ∈ N , we denote by L−i the set
×j 6=iLj . For each y−i ∈ L−i, and any ℓ ∈ Li, (y−i, ℓi) denotes the compound alternative
x such that xi = ℓ and xj = yj, ∀j 6= i. The vector 0N = (0, . . . , 0) is the null alternative
of L, and kN = (k1, . . . , kn) is the top element of L. For each x ∈ L, we denote by
S(x) = {i ∈ N | xi > 0} the support of x, and by K(x) = {i ∈ N |xi = ki} the kernel of
x.
Let x, y ∈ L and T ⊆ N \ {∅}. xT is the restriction of x to T . We write x ≤ y if
xi ≤ yi for every i ∈ N , xT < kT if xT ≤ (k − 1)T and xT > 0T if xT ≥ 1T .
The preferences of a Decision Maker (DM) over the alternatives are supposed to be
represented by a function v : L → R. For the sake of generality, we do not make any
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assumption on v, except that
v(0N) = 0. (1)
For convenience, we assume from now on that all attributes have the same number of
elements, i.e., ki = k for every i ∈ N (k ∈ N). Note that if this is not the case, we set
k = maxi∈N ki, and we extend v : L→ R to v
′ : {0, . . . , k}N → R by
v′(x) = v(y) where yi = min(xi, ki) ∀i ∈ N.
This amounts to duplicating the last element ki of Li when ki < k. Under this assumption,
we recover well-known concepts.
When k = 1, v is a pseudo-Boolean function v : {0, 1}N → R vanishing at 0N . It
can be put in the form of a function µ : 2N → R, with v(∅) = 0, which is a game in
cooperative game theory. A capacity (Choquet, 1953) or fuzzy measure (Sugeno, 1974)
is a monotone game, i.e., satisfying v(A) ≤ v(B) whenever A ⊆ B. For the general case
(when k ≥ 1), v : L → R fulfilling 1 corresponds exactly to the concept of multichoice
game (Hsiao and Raghavan, 1993), and the numbers 0, 1, . . . , k in Li are seen as the
level of activity of the players. A k-ary capacity (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2003) is a
multichoice game v satisfying the monotonicity condition: or each x, y ∈ L s.t. x ≤ y,
v(x) ≤ v(y) and the normalization condition: v(k, . . . k) = 1. Hence, a k-ary capacity
represents a preference on L which is increasing with the value of the attributes. We
denote by G(L) the set of multichoice games defined on L.
The derivative of v ∈ G(L) at x ∈ L w.r.t. i ∈ N such that xi < k is defined by
∆iv(x) = v(x+ 1i)− v(x).
The derivative of v ∈ G(L) at x ∈ L w.r.t. T ⊆ N \ {∅} such that ∀i ∈ T, xi < k is
defined recursively as follows,
∆T v(x) = ∆i(∆T\iv(x)).
The general expression for the derivative of v ∈ G(L) is given by,
∆T v(x) =
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−av(x+ 1A), ∀T ⊆ N \ {∅}, ∀i ∈ T, xi < k.
3 Values and interaction indices
3.1 The case of classical TU-games
In cooperative game theory, the notion of value or power index is one of the most impor-
tant concepts. A value is a function φ : G(2N) → RN which assigns a payoff vector to
any game v ∈ G(2N). In MCDA, values are interpreted as importance indices for criteria.
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of player i ∈ N is given by
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
(
v(S ∪ i)− v(S)
)
, ∀v ∈ G(2N).
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The concept of interaction index, which is an extension of that of value, was introduced
axiomatically to measure the interaction phenomena among players in cooperative game
theory or criteria in multicriteria decision analysis. For a game v ∈ G(2N), the interaction
index of v is a function Iv : 2N → R that assigns to every coalition T ⊆ N its interaction
degree.
? proposed an interaction index I(ij) for a pair of elements i, j ∈ N to estimate
how well i and j interact. Grabisch (1997) defined and extended the interaction index to
coalitions containing more than two players. The interaction index (Grabisch, 1997) of a
coalition S ⊆ N in a game v ∈ G(2N) is defined by
IvSh(S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
(n− t− s)!t!
(n− s+ 1)!
∑
K⊆S
(−1)s−kv(K ∪ T ).
Note that when S = {i}, the interaction index coincides with the Shapley value.
A first axiomatization of the interaction index have been proposed by Grabisch and Roubens
(1999), and it is axiomatized in a way similar to the Shapley value. The following axioms
have been considered by Grabisch and Roubens :
• Linearity axiom (L): Iv(S) is linear on G(2N) for every S ⊆ N .
• Dummy axiom (D): For any v ∈ G(2N), and any i ∈ N dummy for v, Iv(S ∪ i) =
0, ∀S ⊆ N \ i.
i ∈ N is said to be dummy for v if ∀S ⊆ N \ i, v(S ∪ i) = v(s) + v(i).
• Symmetry axiom (S) : For any v ∈ G(2N), any permutation σ on N and any
S ⊆ N \∅, Iv(S) = Iσv(σS).
• Efficiency axiom (E) : For any v ∈ G(2N) and any i ∈ N ,
∑
i∈N I
v(i) = v(N).
• Recursive axiom (R1): For any v ∈ G(2N) and any S ⊆ N, s > 1,
Iv(S) = Iv
−j
∪j (S \ j)− Iv
−j
(S \ j), ∀j ∈ S,
where, v−j is the game v restricted to elements in N \ j defined by v−j(S) =
v(S), ∀S ⊆ N \ j, and v−j∪j is the game on N \ j in the presence of j defined by
v−j∪j (S) = v(S ∪ j)− v(S), ∀S ⊆ N \ j.
• Recursive axiom (R2): For any v ∈ G(2N) and any S ⊆ N, s > 1,
IvSh(S) = I
v[S]([S])−
∑
K⊆N\S
K 6=∅,S
Iv
−K
(S \K),
where, v[S] is the game where all elements in S are considered as a single element
denoted [S], it is defined by, for any K ⊆ N \ S:
v[S](K) = v(K),
v[S](K ∪ [S]) = v(K ∪ S).
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The axiom (R1) says that the interaction of the players in S is equal to the interaction
between the criteria in S\j in the presence of j minus the interaction between the criteria
of S\j in the absence of j. Axiom (R2) expresses interaction of S in terms of all successive
interactions of subsets. The authors have shown that (R1) and (R2) are equivalent under
(L), (D) and (S) axioms.
The following theorem was shown by Grabisch and Roubens (1999).
Theorem 1. Under axioms (L), (D), (D), (E), and ((R1) or (R2)), for all v ∈ G(2N),
Iv(S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
(n− t− s)!t!
(n− s+ 1)!
∑
K⊆S
(−1)s−kv(K ∪ T ), ∀S ⊆ N.
3.2 The case of games on lattices
Grabisch and Labreuche (2007) generalized the notion of interaction defined for criteria
modelled by capacities, by considering functions defined on lattices. The interaction
(Grabisch and Labreuche, 2007) is based on the notion of derivative of a function defined
on a lattice. For this, they introduce the following definitions:
Let i = (0−j, ij) with ij ∈ Lj , j ∈ N . Let x, y ∈ L with y = ∨
n
k=1ik and v ∈ G(L).
The derivative of v w.r.t. i at point x ∈ L is given by:
∆iv(x) = v(x ∨ i)− v(x),
and the derivative of v w.r.t. y at x is given by:
∆yv(x) = ∆i1(∆i2(. . .∆inv(x) . . .)).
The following definition has been proposed by Grabisch and Labreuche (Grabisch and Labreuche,
2007) :
Definition 1. Let J ⊆ N , and x = ∨j∈J ij , with ij = (0−j, ℓj), ℓj ∈ Lj \ {0}.
Iv(x) =
∑
y∈A(x)
αjh(y)∆xv(y),
where, A(x) = {y ∈ L|yj = k or 0 if j /∈ J, yj = xj − 1 else }, h(y) is the number of
components of y to k and αjh(y) =
(n−j−h(y))!h(y)!
(n−j+1)!
.
4 Characterization of the importance index for mul-
tichoice games
In this section, we present the importance index (value) for multichoice games defined by
Ridaoui et al. (2017b) together with its axiomatization. Let φ be a value defined for any
v ∈ G(L).
Linearity axiom (L) : φ is linear on G(L), i.e., ∀v, w ∈ G(L), ∀α ∈ R,
φi(v + αw) = φi(v) + αφi(w), ∀i ∈ N.
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An attribute i ∈ N is said to be null for v ∈ G(L) if
v(x+ 1i) = v(x), ∀x ∈ L, xi < k.
Null axiom (N): If an attribute i is null for v ∈ G(L), then
φi(v) = 0.
Let σ be a permutation on N . For all x ∈ L, we denote σ(x)σ(i) = xi. For all v ∈ G(L),
the game σ ◦ v is defined by σ ◦ v(σ(x)) = v(x).
Symmetry axiom (S): For any permutation σ of N ,
φσ(i)(σ ◦ v) = φi(v), ∀i ∈ N.
Invariance axiom (I): Let us consider two games v, w ∈ G(L) such that, for
some i ∈ N ,
v(x+ 1i)− v(x) = w(x)− w(x− 1i), ∀x ∈ L, xi /∈ {0, k}
v(x−i, 1i)− v(x−i, 0i) = w(x−i, ki)− w(x−i, ki − 1), ∀x−i ∈ L−i,
then φi(v) = φi(w).
Efficiency axiom (E): For all v ∈ G(L),∑
i∈N
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
xj<k
(
v(x+ 1N)− v(x)
)
.
Ridaoui et al. (2017a) have shown the following result.
Theorem 2. Let φ be a value defined for any v ∈ G(L).
(i) If φ fulfills (L) and (N) then there exists a family of real constants {bix, x ∈ L} such
that
φi(v) =
∑
x∈L
xi<k
bix
(
v(x+ 1i)− v(x)
)
, ∀i ∈ N. (2)
(ii) If φ fulfills (L), (N) and (I) then
φi(v) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
bix−i
(
v(x−i, k)− v(x−i, 0)
)
, ∀i ∈ N. (3)
(iii) If φ fulfills (L), (N), (I) and (S) then
φi(v) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
bn(x−i)
(
v(x−i, k)− v(x−i, 0)
)
, ∀i ∈ N, (4)
where n(x−i) = (n0, n1, . . . , nk) with nj the number of components of x−i being
equal to j.
(iv) If φ fulfills (L), (N), (I), (S) and (E) then
φi(v) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
(
n− σ(x−i)− 1
)
!κ(x−i)!(
n + κ(x−i)− σ(x−i)
)
!
(
v(x−i, k)− v(x−i, 0)
)
, ∀i ∈ N (5)
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5 Axiomatization of the interaction index
In this section we intend to define axiomatically the interaction index of multichoice
games. The approach presented here is based on a recursion formula, starting from the
importance index (value) defined in Section 4, as in (Grabisch and Roubens, 1999). An
interaction index of the k-ary multichoice game v ∈ G(L) is a function Iv : 2N → R.
The first axiom (L) is trivially generalized for the interaction index.
Linearity axiom (L) : Iv is linear on G(L), i.e., ∀v, w ∈ G(L), ∀α ∈ R,
Iv+αw = Iv + αIw.
Proposition 1. Under (L), for every T ⊆ N \ {∅}, there exists real constants aTx , for all
x ∈ L, such that for every v ∈ G(L)
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
aTx v(x). (6)
Proof . It is easy to check that the above formula satisfies the linearity axiom. Con-
versely, we consider Iv satisfying (L). We have ∀v ∈ G(L), v =
∑
x∈L v(x)δx. Then by
(L),
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
v(x)Iδx(T ), ∀T ⊆ N \ {∅}
Setting aTx = I
δx(T ), ∀x ∈ L, ∀T ⊆ N , we obtain the wished result.
Remark 1. Let i ∈ N be a null criterion for v ∈ G(L). We have,
∀T ⊆ N, T ∋ i,∆Tv(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ L, x+ 1T ≤ kT .
∀T ⊆ N, T ∋ i,∆jv(x) = 0, ∀j ∈ T, ∀x ∈ L, x+ 1j ≤ k.
Null axiom (N): If a criterion i is null for v ∈ G(L), then for all T ⊆ N
such that T ∋ i, Iv(T ) = 0.
Proposition 2. Under axioms (L) and (N), for every T ⊆ N \ {∅}, there exist real
constants bTx , for all x ∈ L, with x+ 1T ≤ kT , such that for every v ∈ G(L)
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx∆T v(x). (7)
To prove this result, the following lemmas are useful.
Lemma 1. Let A ⊆ N .
a(xA,x−A) =
∑
C⊆A
(−1)a−c
kA∑
ℓC=xC
ℓA\C=(x+1)A\C
a(ℓC ,ℓA\C ,x−A), ∀xA ∈ LA \ {kA}.
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Proof . Let A ⊆ N . We proceed by recurrence on |A|. The relation is obviously true for
|A| = 0. Let us suppose that the relation is true for any set of at most |A| − 1 elements,
and try to show it is also true for any set of |A| elements. We have , for all xA ∈ LA\{k}
A,
a(xA,x−A) = a(xA\i,xi,x−A)
=
∑
C⊆A\i
(−1)a−c−1
kA\i∑
lC=xC
ℓA\C∪i=(x+1)A\C∪i
a(ℓC ,ℓA\C∪i,xi,x−A)
=
∑
C⊆A\i
(−1)a−c−1
kA\i∑
ℓC=xC
ℓA\C∪i=(x+1)A\C∪i
( k∑
ℓi=xi
a(ℓC ,ℓA\C∪i,ℓi,x−A) −
k∑
ℓi=xi+1
a(ℓC ,ℓA\C∪i,ℓi,x−A)
)
=
∑
C⊆A\i
(−1)a−c−1
( kA∑
ℓC∪i=xC∪i
ℓA\C∪i=(x+1)A\C∪i
a(ℓC ,ℓA\C∪i,ℓi,x−A) −
kA∑
ℓC=xC
ℓA\C=(x+1)A\C
a(ℓC ,ℓA\C∪i,ℓi,x−A)
)
=
∑
C⊆A\i
(
(−1)a−c−1
kA∑
ℓC∪i=xC∪i
ℓA\C∪i=(x+1)A\C∪i
a(ℓC ,ℓA\C ,x−A) + (−1)
a−c
kA∑
ℓC=xC
ℓA\C=(x+1)A\C
a(ℓC ,ℓA\C ,x−A)
)
=
∑
C⊆A
(−1)a−c
kA∑
ℓC=xC
ℓA\C=(x+1)A\C
a(ℓC ,ℓA\C ,x−A)
Lemma 2.
∑
x∈L
x<kN
bx
∑
A⊆N
(−1)n−av(x+ 1A) =
∑
A⊆N
0A<xA<kA
∑
B⊆N\A
C⊆A
(−1)a+b−cb(xA−1C ,0B ,(k−1)N\A∪B)v(xA, 0B, kN\A∪B)
Proof . We shall proceed by induction on n. For simplicity, we denote N \ i by S,
(xA, 0B, kS\A∪B) by x
S
A,B and (xA − 1C , 0B, (k − 1)S\A∪B) by x
S
A,C,B, with C ⊆ A. The
relation is obviously true for n = 1. Let us suppose that the relation is true for any set
of at most n − 1 elements, and try to show it is also true for any set of n elements. We
8
have∑
x∈L
x<kN
bx
∑
A⊆N
(−1)n−av(x+ 1A)
=
∑
x∈L
x<kN
bx
∑
A⊆N\i
(−1)n−a
(
v(x+ 1A)− v(x+ 1A∪i)
)
=
∑
xi<ki
∑
x−i∈L−i
x−i<k−i
bx−i,xi
∑
A⊆S
(−1)s−a
(
v(x−i + 1A, xi + 1)− v(x−i + 1A, xi)
)
=
∑
A⊆S
0A<xA<kA
xi<ki
∑
B⊆S\A
C⊆A
(−1)a+b−cb(xS
A,C,B
,xi)
(
v(xSA,B, xi + 1)− v(x
S
A,B, xi)
)
=
∑
A⊆S
0A<xA<kA
[ ∑
B⊆S\A
C⊆A
(
(−1)a+b−cb(xS
A,C,B
,ki−1)v(x
S
A,B, ki) + (−1)
a+b+1−cb(xS
A,C,B
,0i)v(x
S
A,B, 0i)
)
+
∑
B⊆S\A
C⊆A
0<xi<ki
(
(−1)a+1+b−cb(xS
A,C,B
,xi)v(x
S
A,B, xi) + (−1)
a+b−cb(xS
A,C,B
,xi−1)v(x
S
A,B, xi)
)]
=
∑
A⊆S
0A<xA<kA
[ ∑
B⊆S\A
C⊆A
(
(−1)a+b−cb(xN
A,C,B
)v(x
N
A,B) + (−1)
a+b+1−cb(xS
A,C,B∪i)
v(xSA,B∪i)
)
+
∑
B⊆S\A
C⊆A
0<xi<ki
(
(−1)a+1+b−cb(xS
A∪i,C,B)
v(xSA∪i,B) + (−1)
a+b−cb(xS
A∪i,C∪i,B)
v(xSA∪i,B)
)]
=
∑
A⊆S
0A<xA<kA
( ∑
B⊆N\A
C⊆A
(−1)a+b−cb(xN
A,C,B
)v(x
N
A,B) +
∑
B⊆S\A
C⊆A∪i
0<xi<ki
(−1)a+1+b−cb(xS
A∪i,C,B)
v(xSA∪i,B)
)
=
∑
A⊆N
0A<xA<kA
∑
B⊆N\A
C⊆A
(−1)a+b−cb(xA−1C ,0B ,(k−1)N\A∪B)v(xA, 0B, kN\A∪B)
which is the desired result.
We now prove Proposition 2.
Proof . It is easy to check that the formula satisfies the axioms. Conversely, we consider
Iv satisfying (L) and (N). Let v ∈ G(L), and T ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
By Proposition 1, there exists aTx ∈ R, for all x ∈ L, such that,
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
aTx v(x).
Then,
Iv(T ) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
∑
xi∈Li
aT(x−i,xi)v(x−i, xi).
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Assume now that i is null criterion for v. We have v(x−i, xi) = v(x−i, 0i). Hence,
Iv(T ) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
∑
xi∈Li
aT(x−i,xi)v(x−i, 0i).
By (N), we have, for all i ∈ T null, and for all x−i ∈ L−i,∑
xi∈Li
aT(x−i,xi) = 0.
∀x−T ∈ L−T , let A ⊆ T,B ⊆ T \ A, and set
bT(xA,0B ,(k−1)T\A∪B,x−T ) = (−1)
b
kA∑
ℓA=(x+1)A
aT(ℓA,0B ,kT\A∪B,x−T ), ∀xA ∈ LA \ {0, k}
A.
Then, we have, ∀x−T ∈ L−T , ∀A ⊆ T, ∀B ⊆ T \ A, ∀xA ∈ LA \ {0, k}
A,
aT(xA,0B,kT\A∪B,x−T ) =
∑
C⊆A
(−1)a−c
kA∑
ℓC=xC
ℓA\C=(x+1)A\C
aT(ℓC ,ℓA\C ,0B,kT\A∪B,x−T ) (using Lemma 1)
=
∑
C⊆A
(−1)a−c
kA∑
ℓC=(xC−1C)+1C
ℓA\C=xA\C+1A\C
aT(ℓC ,ℓA\C ,0B ,kT\A∪B,x−T )
= (−1)b
∑
C⊆A
(−1)a−c(−1)b
kA∑
y=((x−1C )+1)A
aT(y,0B ,kT\A∪B,x−T )
= (−1)b
∑
C⊆A
(−1)a−cbT(xA−1C ,0B,(k−1)T\A∪B ,x−T )
Therefore, it suffices to replace the values of aTx in the formula (6), and then the result is
established.
Iv(T ) =
∑
x−T∈L−T
∑
xT∈LT
aT(xT ,x−T )v(xT , x−T )
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
∑
A⊆T
0A<xA<kA
∑
B⊆T\A
aT(xA,0B ,kT\A∪B,x−T )v(xA, 0B, kT\A∪B, x−T )
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
∑
A⊆T
0A<xA<kA
∑
B⊆T\A
(−1)b
∑
C⊆A
(−1)a−cbT(xA−1C ,0B,(k−1)T\A∪B ,x−T )v(xA, 0B, kT\A∪B, x−T )
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
∑
xT∈LT
xT<kT
bTx
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−av(x+ 1A) (using Lemma 2)
=
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−av(x+ 1A).
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Invariance axiom (I): Let us consider two functions v, w ∈ G(L) such that,
for all i ∈ N ,
v(x+ 1i)− v(x) = w(x)− w(x− 1i), ∀x ∈ L, xi /∈ {0, k}
v(x−i, 1i)− v(x−i, 0i) = w(x−i, ki)− w(x−i, ki − 1), ∀x−i ∈ L−i.
Then Iv(T ∪ i) = Iw(T ∪ i), ∀T ⊆ N \ i.
Proposition 3. Under axioms (L), (N) and (I), ∀v ∈ G(L), ∀i ∈ N ,
Iv(T ) =
∑
x−T∈L−T
bTx−T
∑
S⊆T
(−1)t−sv(0S, kT\S, x−T ).
Proof . It is easy to check that the above formula satisfies the axioms. Conversely, we
consider Iv satisfying (L), (N) and (I). Let v, w ∈ G(L), and T ⊆ N . By Proposition 2
and the axiom (I), we have, for any i ∈ T
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx∆Tv(x)
=
∑
x−i∈L−i
xT\i<kT\i
(
bT(0i,x−i)∆T\i∆iv(0i, x−i) +
∑
xi∈Li
xi /∈{0,k}
bTx∆T\i∆iv(x)
)
=
∑
x−i∈L−i
xT\i<kT\i
(
bT(0i,x−i)∆T\i∆iw
(
(k − 1)i, x−i
)
+
∑
xi∈Li
xi /∈{0,k}
bTx∆T\i∆iw(x− 1i)
)
=
∑
x−i∈L−i
xT\i<kT\i
(
bT(0i,x−i)∆T\i∆iw
(
(k − 1)i, x−i
)
+
∑
xi∈Li
xi<k−1
bTxi+1i,x−i∆T\i∆iw(x)
)
,
and,
Iw(T ) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
xT\i<kT\i
(
bT(
(k−1)i,x−i
)∆T\i∆iw((k − 1)i, x−i)+ ∑
xi∈Li
xi<k−1
bTx∆T\i∆iw(x)
)
,
then, bTxi,x−i = b
T
xi+1i,x−i
, ∀x−i ∈ L−i, ∀xi ∈ Li \ {k, k − 1} and any i ∈ T . Hence,
bTxT ,x−T = b
T
(x+1)T ,x−T
, for all x−T ∈ L−T and for all xT ∈ LT such that xT < kT .
We conclude that the coefficient bTxT ,x−T does not depend on xT .
We set thus bTx−T := b
T
xT ,x−T
. Hence, for any v ∈ G(L), and for any T ⊆ N , we have,
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bTx∆Tv(x)
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
bTx−T
∑
xT∈LT
xT<kT
∆T v(x)
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
bTx−T
∑
S⊆T
(−1)t−sv(0T\S, kS, x−T )
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We introduce the Symmetry axiom.
Symmetry axiom (S): For all v ∈ G(L), for all permutation σ on N ,
Iσ◦v(σ(T )) = Iv(T ), ∀T ⊆ N.
Proposition 4. Under axioms (L), (N), (S), ∀v ∈ G(L), ∀T ⊆ N ,
Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈L
xT<kT
bxT ;n0,n1,...,nk∆T v(x), (8)
where bxT ;n0,n1,...,nk ∈ R, and nj = |{ℓ ∈ N \ T, xℓ = j}|
Proof . Let v ∈ G(L) and let σ be a permutation on N . For every x ∈ L, we put
y = σ−1(x). From Proposition 2, we have ∀T ⊆ N
Iv(T ) =
∑
y∈L
yT<kT
bTy∆Tv(y),
and,
Iσ◦v(σ(T )) =
∑
x∈L
xσ(T )<kσ(T )
bσ(T )x ∆σ(T )σ ◦ v(x)
=
∑
y∈L
yT<kT
b
σ(T )
σ(y)∆T v(y).
Then, from the symmetry axiom, we have for all y ∈ L such that yT < kT : b
σ(T )
σ(y) = b
T
y .
For every y ∈ L such that yT < k, we can write,
bT(yT ;y−T ) = b
T
y = b
σ(T )
σ(y) = b
σ(T )
(σ(y)σ(T ) ;σ(y)−σ(T ))
= b
σ(T )
(yT ;σ(y)−σ(T ))
Assuming that σ(T ) = T , then,
bT(yT ;y−T ) = b
T
(yT ;σ(y)−σ(T ))
For a fixed T , bT(yT ;σ(y)−σ(T )) depends only on n(y−T ), with n(y−T ) = {n0(y−T ), n1(y−T ), . . . , nk(y−T )},
and nj(y−T ) = |{ℓ ∈ N \ T |yℓ = j}|.
pTyT ;y−T = p
T
yT ;n(y−T )
Suppose now that σ(T ) = S (with S 6= T ), and σ(ℓ) = ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ N \ S ∪ T , then,
bT(yT ;n(y−T )) = b
σ(T )
(yT ;n(σ(y)−σ(T )))
= b
σ(T )
(yT ;n(y−T ))
we can conclude that the value bTyT ;n(y−T ) does not depend on the exponent T . We denote
by byT ;n(y−T ) this value.
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Proposition 5. Under axioms (L), (N), (I) and (S), for any v ∈ G(L), ∀T ⊆ N ,
Iv(T ) =
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
∑
S⊆T
(−1)t−sv(0T\S, kS, x−T ), (9)
where bn(x−T ) ∈ R, n(x−T ) = (n0, n1, . . . , nk) and nj = |{ℓ ∈ N \ T, xℓ = j}|
Efficiency axiom (E): For all v ∈ G(L),
∑
i∈N
Iv(i) =
∑
x∈L
xj<k
(
v(x+ 1N)− v(x)
)
.
We introduce now the Recursivity axiom which is the exact counterpart of the one for
classical games in (Grabisch and Roubens, 1999). For this, we introduce the following
definitions:
Let v be a multichoice game in G(L) and S ⊆ N . We introduce the restricted multi-
choice game v−S of v, which is defined on N \ S as follows
v−S(x−S) = v(x−S, 0S), ∀x−S ∈ L−S .
The restriction of v to i ∈ N in the presence of i denoted by v−ii is the multichoice game
on L−i defined by
v−ii (x−i) = v(x−i, ki)− v(0−i, ki), ∀x−i ∈ L−i.
Recursivity axiom (R): For any v ∈ G(L),
Iv(T ) = Iv
−i
i (T \ i)− Iv
−i
(T \ i), ∀T ⊆ N \ {∅}, ∀i ∈ T.
Lemma 3. Under axioms (L), (N), (I) (S) and (R), for any v ∈ G(L), ∀T ⊆ N \ {∅},
Iv(T ) =
∑
A⊆T
A 6=∅
(−1)t−aIv
(−T )∪[A]
[A] ([A]), (10)
with v
(−T )∪[A]
[A] is the reduced multichoice game of v to T with respect to A defined on the
set {0, . . . , k}(N\T )∪[A] as follows:
v
(−T )∪[A]
[A] (x−T , ℓ[A]) = v(x−T , ℓA, 0T\A), ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
Proof . We suppose that the axioms (L), (N), (I), (S) and (R) are satisfied. We
proceed by induction on |T |. The formula is true for |T | = 1. Let us assume it is true up
to |T | = t− 1, and try to prove it for t elements. By induction assumption we have, for
any v ∈ G(L), and i ∈ T ,
Iv
−i
(T \ i) =
∑
A⊆T\i
A 6=∅
(−1)t−a−1Iv
(−T )∪[A]
[A] ([A]),
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Iv
−i
i (T \ i) =
∑
A⊆T\i
A 6=∅
(−1)t−a−1Iv
(−T )∪[A]
[A],i ([A]).
with v
(−T )∪[A]
[A],i (x−T , ℓ[A]) = v(x−T , ℓA, ki, 0T\A∪i)− v(0−i, ki), ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
Let A ⊆ T \ i such that A 6= ∅. From Proposition 5,
Iv
(−T )∪[A]
[A],i ([A]) =
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v
(−T )∪[A]
[A],i (x−T , k[A])− v
(−T )∪[A]
[A],i (x−T , 0[A])
)
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v(x−T , kA∪i, 0T\A∪i)− v(x−T , ki, 0T\i)
)
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v(x−T , kA∪i, 0T\A∪i)− v(x−T , 0T )
)
−
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v(x−T , ki, 0T\i)− v(x−T , 0T )
)
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v
(−T )∪[A∪i]
[A∪i] (x−T , k[A∪i])− v
(−T )∪[A∪i]
[A∪i] (x−T , 0[A∪i])
)
−
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v(−T )∪i(x−T , ki)− v
(−T )∪i(x−T , 0i)
)
= Iv
(−T )∪[A∪i]
[A∪i] ([A ∪ i])− I
v(−T )∪i(i).
By (R), we have
Iv(T ) = Iv
−i
i (T \ i)− Iv
−i
(T \ i)
=
∑
A⊆T\i
A 6=∅
(−1)t−a−1Iv
(−T )∪[A]
[A],i ([A])−
∑
A⊆T\i
A 6=∅
(−1)t−a−1Iv
(−T )∪[A]
[A] ([A])
=
∑
A⊆T\i
A 6=∅
(−1)t−a−1
(
Iv
(−T )∪[A∪i]
[A∪i] ([A ∪ i])− I
v(−T )∪i(i)
)
−
∑
A⊆T\i
A 6=∅
(−1)t−a−1Iv
(−T )∪[A]
[A] ([A])
=
∑
A⊆T\i
A 6=∅
(−1)t−a−1
(
Iv
(−T )∪[A∪i]
[A∪i] ([A ∪ i])− I
v
(−T )∪[A]
[A] ([A])
)
− Iv
(−T )∪i
(i)
∑
A⊆T\i
A 6=∅
(−1)t−a−1
=
∑
A⊆T\i
A 6=∅
(−1)t−a−1
(
Iv
(−T )∪[A∪i]
[A∪i] ([A ∪ i])− I
v
(−T )∪[A]
[A] ([A])
)
+ (−1)t−1Iv
(−T )∪[i]
[i] ([i])
=
∑
A⊆T
A 6=∅
(−1)t−aIv
(−T )∪[A]
[A] ([A])
Theorem 3. Under axioms (L), (N), (I), (S), (E) and (R), ∀v ∈ G(L), ∀T ⊆ N \∅,
Iv(T ) = Ivs (T ) :=
∑
x−T∈L−T
(n− s(x−T )− t)!k(x−T )!
(n− s(x−T ) + k(x−T )− t+ 1)!
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−av(0T\A, kA, x−T ).
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Proof . Let v ∈ G(L), and T ∈ N \{∅}. By axioms (L), (N), (I), (S) and (E), we have
I
v
(−T )∪[A]
[A] ([A]) =
∑
xT∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v
(−T )∪[A]
[A] (x−T , k[A])− v
(−T )∪[A]
[A] (x−T , 0[A])
)
,
with bn(x−T ) =
(
n− t− s(x−T )
)
!k(x−T )!(
n− t+ 1 + k(x−T )− s(x−T )
)
!
.
By Lemma (3), we have
Iv(T ) =
∑
A⊆T
A 6=∅
(−1)t−aIv
(−T )∪[A]
[A] ([A])
=
∑
A⊆T
A 6=∅
(−1)t−a
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v(x−T , kA, 0T\A)− v(x−T , 0T )
)
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
∑
A⊆T
A 6=∅
(−1)t−a
(
v(x−T , kA, 0T\A)− v(x−T , 0T )
)
=
∑
xT∈L−T
bn(x−T )
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−av(kA, 0T\A, x−T ).
6 Interaction indices for the Choquet integral
We propose in this section an interpretation of the interaction in continuous spaces, that
is, after extending v to the continuous domain [0, k]N . The most usual extension of v on
[0, k]N is the Choquet integral with respect to k-ary capacities (Grabisch and Labreuche,
2003).
Let z ∈ [0, k]N , and q ∈ L such that q = ⌊z⌋ (the floor integer part of z). The Choquet
integral w.r.t. a k-ary capacity v at point z is defined by
Cv(z) = v(q) + Cµq(z − q),
where µq is a capacity given by
µq(A) = v((q + 1)A, q−A)− v(q), ∀A ⊂ N.
Proposition 6. For every v ∈ G(L),
Ivs (T ) =
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
IµxSh(T ), ∀T ⊆ N \ {∅}.
To prove this result, the following combinatorial result is useful.
Lemma 4.
∑
S⊆[A,B]
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
=
(n− b− 1)!a!
(n− b+ a)!
, ∀A,B ⊆ N,A ⊆ B
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Proof . Let A,B ⊆ N , such that A ⊆ B,
∑
S⊆[A,B]
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
=
∑
S⊆[∅,B\A]
(n− s− a− 1)!(s+ a)!
n!
=
b−a∑
s=0
(
b− a
s
)
(n− s− a− 1)!(s+ a)!
n!
=
b−a∑
s=0
(
b− a
s
)∫ 1
0
xn−s−a−1(1− x)s+adx
=
∫ 1
0
xn−b−1(1− x)a
b−a∑
s=0
(
b− a
s
)
xb−a−s(1− x)sdx
=
∫ 1
0
xn−b−1(1− x)adx
=
(n− b− 1)!a!
(n− b+ a)!
We now prove Proposition 6.
Proof . Let T ⊆ N \ {∅}.
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
IµxSh(T ) =
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
∑
S⊆N\T
(n− s− t)!s!
(n− t + 1)!
∆Tµx(S)
=
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
∑
S⊆N\T
(n− s− t)!s!
(n− t + 1)!
∆T v(x+ 1S)
=
∑
z∈L
zT<kT
∆Tv(z)
∑
S⊆N\T
∀j∈S,zj>0
∀j∈N\S,zj<k
(n− s− t)!s!
(n− t+ 1)!
=
∑
z∈L
zT<kT
∆Tv(z)
∑
S⊆N\T∩S(z−T )
S⊇K(z−T )
(n− s− t)!s!
(n− t + 1)!
=
∑
z∈L
zT<kT
∆Tv(z)
∑
S⊆S(z−T )
S⊇K(z−T )
(n− s− t)!s!
(n− t+ 1)!
=
∑
z∈L
zT<kT
(n− s(z−T )− t)!k(z−T )!
(n− s(z−T ) + k(z−T )− t+ 1)!
∆Tv(z).
The interaction index on continuous domain [0, k]N takes the form of the total over
the domain {0, . . . , k − 1}N of the classical interaction index, it means that for each
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elementary cell in the grid L, the interaction index corresponds to the usual interaction
index.
Theorem 4. Let v a k-ary capacity.
Ivs (T ) =
∫
[0,k]n
∂|T |Cv
∂zT
(z) dz, ∀T ⊆ N.
Proof . Let v a k-ary capacity. For every T ⊆ N . ∀x ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}N , we have,
Ivs (T ) =
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
IµxSh(T )
=
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
∫
[0,1]n
∂tCµx
∂zT
(z) dz
=
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
∫
[x,x+1N ]
∂tCµx
∂zT
(z − x) dz
=
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
∫
[x,x+1N ]
∂tCv
∂zT
(z) dz
=
∫
[0,k]n
∂tCv
∂zT
(z) dz.
The interaction index on continous domain appears as the mean of relative amplitude
of the range of Cv w.r.t. T , when the remaining variables take uniformly random values.
The partial derivative is the local interaction of Cv at point z.
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